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Exiled Romanists between Traditions: 
Pringsheim, Schulz and Daube
Kaius Tuori1
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the way Romanists exiled by the Nazis 
reacted and adapted to new scholarly traditions in their writings. Though ancient 
Rome and Roman law remained their primary focus, for scholars in exile, the changing 
of circumstances often meant that they would need to take into account the different 
approaches, focuses of attention and methodologies popular in their adopted countries. 
In Britain, they were also faced with a new kind of political culture and ideals, many of 
which appeared strange while others, such as liberalism and individualism, were seen 
as welcome contrasts to the German tradition taken over and corrupted by the Nazis.
The transformation of scholarship due to exile is a phenomenon that has been 
recorded in numerous studies on exiled scholars.2 In many cases, there was little or 
no change. The theoretical physics done by Einstein at Princeton was perhaps not 
substantively different from the work he had done as a director of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute of Physics in Germany. In a similar way, the art historians recruited to the 
United States were perhaps not prompted to change the content of the work they had 
been doing. For the most extreme example of how the experiences of deprivation, 
persecution and exile affected scholarship, one may look at political scientists such as 
Franz Neumann (who was originally a jurist) or Hannah Arendt (who wrote at length 
about totalitarianism and dictatorship). For lawyers in general, transitioning to a new 
environment was especially hard because the black letter law tends to be so national, 
making it almost impossible for a German lawyer to practice or teach in Britain or in 
the United States beyond a few disciplines.
In order to address the issue of exile and scientific change on Roman law scholars, 
I will focus on three scholars: Fritz Pringsheim, Fritz Schulz and David Daube. The 
reason for the choice is in part obvious, as they were the best known of the Roman 
law scholars who moved to Britain. They also provide a chance to observe important 
variations in political inclinations and age. With all of them, there is the added benefit 
that there are fairly recent biographies of each of them, allowing us to focus on the 
change in their scholarship.3
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For the most part, investigating reactions to new surroundings would demand 
either a control group or a way of investigating what particular influences were 
received and why. However, no such luxury is available to us, because the numbers are 
quite small, and a control group not affected by the Nazi regime is not available, for 
obvious reasons.4 In general, it has been observed that legal scholars going to exile in 
the United States, such as Hans Kelsen or Franz Neumann, tended to end up working 
in political science departments (Ash and Söllner 1996). Another common trajectory 
is that towards comparative law (a favourite among foreign scholars in US law schools 
even today). Some famous names, for example, Ernst Rabel, had, of course, made the 
transfer already much earlier. Then we have Hermann Kantorowicz, who began to 
collaborate with scholars in the United States and the UK earlier on, but died fairly 
early, making the tracing of a transformation even more difficult.
Age and linguistic skills were often a determining factor in acclimatization. The 
young could re-educate and gain necessary skills and contacts to make a new career, 
while the middle-aged and older often struggled. The ones who already knew English 
or had the capacity to learn languages had a clear advantage, but as with learning in 
general, age is a determinant here as well. In this case, Daube was the most likely to 
succeed, having both age and language skills, but both Schulz and Pringsheim were 
polyglots (as all Roman law scholars by necessity are), and, despite their age, able to 
learn. What is equally clear is that the conditions and cultural receptivity of the place 
of exile were of enormous importance. A settler society such as the United States was 
accustomed to people from diverse backgrounds and due to the enormous scale of earlier 
German immigration, had a ready social context into which the exiles could assimilate. 
While some countries were extremely homogenous and insular and thus difficult to 
come into, Britain was in the 1930s a society that was for all its insularity accustomed 
to exiles and people from different backgrounds. Despite this, the social isolation that 
many suffered was considerable. For Schulz and Pringsheim, Oxford was perhaps easier 
than some other places might have been, as they were in an environment where they 
still enjoyed some respect due their academic achievements and where knowledge of 
foreign languages was more common. With Daube, despite his Orthodox background, 
the effect of training in Britain eased his transition into British academic life.
Another way of observing change is that of looking at instances where a scholar 
picks up traits from the scholarly tradition of their adoptive countries. In Roman law, 
this is also not unproblematic. Can one say that there was a particularly British or 
American style of Roman law scholarship or a preoccupation peculiar to those areas 
(apart from the interest in lex Aquilia)? In the case of the move of some of the brightest 
minds of German Roman law scholarship to the UK, is this question equally one of 
their influence in Britain, the fact that their emigration brought forth a new generation 
of Roman law scholars in Britain, people such as Peter Stein, Tony Honoré, Alan 
Rodger or Alan Watson? As we will see, much of the change in approach was due to 
the fact that there was virtually no audience for the highly technical work they had 
done in Germany either in the UK or the United States. While many of the writings in 
exile can be grouped under the heading of ‘advertisement for Roman law’, as superficial 
texts intended to make the audience favourable to the subject, we will equally see how 
some of it was fascinating reinterpretation of matters to a new audience.
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The aim of this inquiry is to observe changes in scholarship and scientific 
approaches with each of our examples, the way that they reoriented their scholarship 
in exile. As such, the results are inevitably contentious and tentative, as people are not 
simple receptacles of ideas or tendencies, and one must not reduce a scholarly change 
to changes in external circumstances. We struggle even to grasp what the experiences 
of persecution and exile meant for these scholars, let alone how it affected their work. 
Despite these challenges, I hope to be able to demonstrate some tentative suggestions 
on how the contrasting experience of Nazism and exile in Britain may have influenced 
them. As we will see, whatever changes are observable, they are essentially more 
nuanced than the works of political scientists who launched into an inquiry of the 
nature of the totalitarian state.
Fritz Pringsheim: An officer in exile
The journey into exile was not easy for Fritz Pringsheim. A German patriot, an officer 
and a conservative, he was not known as an easy person to get along with. He was also 
over fifty when he left, a time when people rarely are at their most flexible and open to 
new ideas. This all meant that, on the face of it, Pringsheim’s prognosis for adaptation to 
new surroundings was not promising. The fall from a high-status position in Germany 
to poverty combined with an unyielding mentality is rarely indicative of the flexibility 
and unprejudiced attitude that getting a new start normally requires.5 But appearances 
can be deceptive.
Pringsheim’s orientation towards Britain took place already in the early 1930s. 
Pringsheim’s first recorded visit was a lecture tour in Oxford under the invitation of 
Francis de Zulueta in 1930, then three years later a stay with William Buckland in 
Cambridge. These visits also led to a series of publications in British journals such as 
the Journal of Roman Studies.6 Thus while Pringsheim only moved into exile in 1939, 
in his scholarship the transfer appears much earlier.7
Pringsheim’s aversion towards the totalitarian regimes, be they communist or 
national socialist was clearly evident already in his writings from the 1920s (of these 
in more detail, see Chapter 8 in this volume). There, he warned against the dangers of 
general principles and political aims, because when given too much weight they could 
be used to circumvent the law (Pringsheim 1930: 160‒2). When the Nazis took power 
in 1933, Pringsheim criticized their legal policies early on in his lectures. He would go 
as far as writing an open letter to Carl Schmitt, at that point the main legal ideologue 
of the Nazi regime, about the role of Roman law in Germany. The Nazi policy had 
been to replace Roman law with Germanic people’s law, but Pringsheim wrote that this 
was clearly wrong as Roman law was an organic part of the German legal tradition. 
Though openly challenged, Schmitt was unenthusiastic about the confrontation and 
no consequences resulted.8
The way that Pringsheim was treated in Germany got progressively worse during 
the 1930s. He was, early on, protected from dismissal (under the Nazi law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service on 7 April 1933) by his status as a 
Frontkämpfer. (During the First World War he had served as an officer on front-line 
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duty both on the Western and Eastern fronts.) This privilege was later abolished and 
in 1935 he was removed from his teaching duties as professor. Rather than dismissed 
outright, professors who were removed were often placed on different kinds of 
administrative leaves or moved to different universities where they were not given 
students or salaries. In the case of Pringsheim, in 1936 he was given a position in the 
research project at the Prussian Academy of Sciences working on an edition of the 
Basilika. The task was one that he had been interested in already when working with 
Ludwig Mitteis as a student (Honoré 2004: 6; Breunung and Walther 2012: 410). What 
this meant was that he no longer had the protection of his loyal students, because 
the Nazi policy was to remove all Jewish scholars from positions of teaching and 
influencing students.
One of the surprising effects of Nazi repression was the way that the impact of 
repressive measures rippled into the society at large as individuals and institutions 
began to anticipate the limitations and sanctions. Thus, even though publishing works 
by Jewish scholars was not prohibited, journals stopped taking them and removed Jews 
from positions of authority. As a result, Pringsheim’s last publication in Germany was 
in 1934. The ban on Jewish authors was implemented through self-censorship and 
the implied threat of losing publishing subsidies that most scholarly publications in 
Germany relied on. In addition to not publishing works by Jewish scholars, they were 
not to be quoted except in a negative fashion.9
Possibly thinking that his social and professional standing would protect him 
from harm, Pringsheim would not go into exile until the last minute. Even then, 
the deprivations of being taken to a Nazi concentration camp in Germany was 
repeated in a sense when he was also arrested and taken to a prison camp in the UK. 
After Kristallnacht on 9 November 1938, Pringsheim was arrested and put into a 
concentration camp. He was released three weeks later. However, his mother had died 
during the ordeal, just two days after Kristallnacht. Like many others, Pringsheim had 
searched for an academic job in Britain, but the opportunities were not good. The 
shock of incarceration meant that he would accept a less than satisfactory offer from 
Merton College in Oxford. Even Oxford proved to be hazardous. After being arrested 
for suspicious activities (listening to the radio with his sons), Pringsheim was interned 
on the Isle of Man (Honoré 2004: 15‒16; Breunung and Walther 2012: 425).
In the case of Pringsheim, his work contained much that was potentially politically 
sensitive in the Third Reich, even though it is not that obvious. What could be political 
about Greek law of sale? For the most part, the change in scholarship from the Basilika 
to the Greek law of sale was prompted (as noted by Honoré) by the lack of materials 
available in Oxford. This is not to say that the topic was not political. In fact, what the 
research implied was that many of the principles that were dear to the German legal 
science were in fact the products of the hated post-classical Roman law.10 This was a 
long-standing debate that had been exacerbated by the focus on interpolationism. For 
Nazi scholars and even many conservatives in academia, the very idea that the texts of 
Roman law as they were now known were not purely Roman but rather the product 
of Greek, Hellenistic or even Semitic scholars who had edited them was a matter of 
great importance and passion. For conservatives like Salvatore Riccobono, the idea of 
oriental origins laid doubt on the whole legitimacy of Roman law as the product of pure 
Roman Law and idea of Europe.indb   38 10-10-2018   14:50:35
  Exiled Romanists between Traditions 39
Roman spirit. For Nazis like Ernst Schönbauer, the oriental roots would have meant 
that the law would be racially impure (Riccobono 1925‒6; Schönbauer 1939: 390‒1).
One may also see an interesting counter-narrative to the Nazi ideas of law in some 
of Pringsheim’s earlier texts. For example, in an article published in 1934, he would 
present Rome as an empire of peace, prosperity and law, where even the lowliest 
people are guaranteed their rights, and the rule of law would be safeguarded by an 
independent legal profession. Even those with limited rights such as slaves would be 
protected against abuse (Pringsheim 1934: 141‒53). What Pringsheim did was to raise 
cosmopolitan Rome as an ideal, as a model of a society and its treatment of others. 
This painted a stark contrast towards the nascent legal policies of Nazi Germany, 
where rights were not universal but rather determined by racial and ethnic heritage. 
According to the Nazis, law was subordinate to political expediency in that the will of 
the Führer was the highest law (Lepsius 2003; Koontz 2003; Stolleis 1998). In 1934, the 
last vestiges of legalism had been removed from the acts of the Nazis; with the purge 
known as the night of the long knives in late June and early July, even the most ardent 
supporters had to contend with the fact that the party would not shy away from openly 
murdering its own supporters.
As Honoré writes in his biography, Pringsheim was not a good fit for British 
legal academia, but much of the blame was due to his personality, which appeared 
haughty and Prussian to the British. What is equally clear is how rooted in the 
German tradition his work remained, meaning that the intake of new ideas was fairly 
limited. The praise he gives to the Roman jurists and their method can be seen as a 
Figure 2 Public shaming of Jewish women in Linz, Austria, during the Kristallnacht, 
November 1938. Photo by Galerie Bilderwelt/Getty Images.
Roman Law and idea of Europe.indb   39 10-10-2018   14:50:36
40  Roman Law and the Idea of Europe
reflection of the type of scholarly approaches to legal science that had been the style 
of German scholarship from the nineteenth century onwards.11 He sought parallels 
between Roman and English law, appreciating the practical, problem-oriented nature 
of English jurisprudence. Fairly soon after the war, he started to return to Freiburg 
periodically, helping in the reestablishment of the university. At the same time, he 
cultivated students both in Oxford (the most famous of them Honoré himself) and 
in Freiburg. He would even help Franz Wieacker, who had become deeply involved in 
the Nazi movement, to be rehabilitated after the war.12 Pringsheim’s position became 
thus progressively stronger both in Britain and in Germany, enabling him to advocate 
a return to normality and the resumption of the study of classical Roman law.
The example of Pringsheim shows a distinct turn of scholarship, but less so in the 
attitudes towards politics and science at large. It is clear that Pringsheim as a lawyer 
was deeply committed to law and jurisprudence and saw the dangers of excessive 
political power to the law. This conviction only solidified during the Nazi years and in 
British exile. In his published works, British exile meant the loss of a specialist audience 
of Continental Romanists, with whom he had numerous combative exchanges on 
very specialized subjects, and forced him to address more fundamental issues. He 
had to publish pieces that were aimed at a general legal audience, perhaps in order 
to gain more support for himself and the subject of Roman law. However, despite his 
illustrious students at Oxford, Pringsheim remained a German nationalist, and his 
prime reference group was in Germany. Even the book he wrote in exile about vulgar 
law was published in Germany, not by Oxford University Press (Pringsheim 1950). He 
would take a forgiving stance towards the former Nazis, perhaps out of necessity, since 
they were so numerous and usually kept their positions in academia even after the war. 
Pringsheim’s letters show that he considered return and taking an active part in the 
reorganization of the Freiburg University as a crucial part of his efforts to guide German 
students towards the ideas of justice, democracy, and rule of law and to prevent the 
resurgence of Nazism. Freiburg was after all in the French zone of occupation where 
the repressive and punitive measures were harsh and caused hostility.
Fritz Schulz: From interpolationism to the freedom of law
Our second case is Fritz Schulz, who was roughly the same age as Pringsheim and 
left Germany two months after him. What is different between them is that while 
Pringsheim returned to his chair in Freiburg after the war, Schulz never did.
Schulz’s story of emigration has recently been told in detail by Ernst, but we can 
recapitulate the most important points here. Schulz had been selected as a professor 
of Roman law in Berlin in 1931, two years before the Nazi takeover, after chairs in 
Freiburg, Kiel, Göttingen and Bonn. Pringsheim and Schulz may have already been 
considered to have peaked in their careers; Schulz was fifty-four years old when the 
Nazis came to power. Like Pringsheim, Schulz was not Jewish but of Jewish ancestry 
and thus a target of the racial laws. He was also a member of the DDP, or the Deutsche 
Demokratische Partei, one of the primary opposition parties before it was banned. 
Unlike Pringsheim, who was protected by his status as a front soldier, Schulz was early 
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on faced with the inquiries of the Nazi bureaucracy and the deprivations of status and 
wealth that went with this. The way that these things worked was that one was not 
simply dismissed, but various means of removal were used. For Schulz, he was first 
forcibly transferred to Frankfurt am Main in 1934, but not assigned any teaching, but 
finally he was given early retirement from Berlin in 1935. Finally, in 1936, he lost his 
right to teach in Berlin and later he lost his access to libraries. The persecution of 
Schulz was chiefly the work of Carl Schmitt and Karl Eckhard, a young legal historian. 
The Schulzes first sent their children to Britain and, following a short stint in Holland, 
left for Oxford with the help of his editor at OUP, Kenneth Sisam, and his former 
student F. A. Mann.13
As a scholar, Schulz’s main work before the Nazis’ taking of power was tied to the 
interpolationist school. He had worked for the great Index interpolationum project, 
which sought to trace the post-classical interpolations from the preserved texts of 
classical jurists. In the same vein, Schulz produced other works of textual interpretation, 
such as the Epitome of Ulpian or the Sabinus fragments.14
These works were mainly exercises of textual criticism, of removing the encrustations 
of post-classical authors from the works at hand and revealing the authentic texts. 
Interpolationary criticism has since fallen out of favour, mostly because the aim was 
thought to be unreachable. The reason for this was that the textual criticism of a single 
compilation such as the Code of Justinian was not a reliable method. The rejection of 
texts and their parts relied on various criteria, such as textual or substantive criticism. 
Among purely textual grounds were things such as grammatical structure and its dating 
or word selection and its likelihood at a given time. The substantive criticism was based 
on dogmatic issues, whether a rule was typical of classical law, and so forth. There is 
probably no need to delve deeper into the intricacies of interpolationary research and 
the considerable passions that were involved to fairly soundly pronounce that they 
were hardly considered to be of political significance.
What emerged, however, in Schulz’s writings after 1933 is a completely different 
approach. He wrote three main works under distress or in exile: Principles of Roman 
Law (1934, English translation 1936), History of Roman Legal Science (1946), and 
Classical Roman Law (1951). These books are to a greater or lesser degree books 
with agendas.
In the Principles, Schulz outlined his understanding of the underlying principles of 
Roman law, such as the autonomy of law from politics or liberty. He depicted Roman 
law as a creature of the rule of law, maintaining that it was a non-political protector of 
individual freedom. Many of the principles that Schulz presented, such as humanity, 
freedom and trust, may be understood as liberal ideas against the principles of national 
socialist law, the way that law was subjected to national political aims. As a whole, the 
book may be seen as a defence of the position of Roman law in Western civilization and 
an attack on the Nazi doctrine that sought to displace it, a remarkable work in the light 
of the situation it was written in.
The History of Roman Legal Science was initially a chapter for a general book on 
the history of legal science, but the end product was a full-blown glorification of the 
Roman jurists. If the Principles was a book addressing the value of free legal discourse 
and the idea of freedom and justice against the Nazi oppression and the strategic use of 
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law, the Legal Science was another type of cross-cultural endeavour altogether. Its idea 
of jurisprudence as the science of law was purely of German origin, one of systematic 
Rechtswissenschaft. Yet, its execution and its spirit were quite British. His heroes are 
the ‘creative geniuses and daring pioneers’ (p. 99) of the Roman Republic. It sought 
to present the practical genius of Roman jurists that manifested itself in the responsa 
given to clients. A jurist would abstain from advocacy, a profession Schulz considered 
below the legal profession, nor would he ‘suffer the noisome weed of rhetoric’ (p. 55). 
The science of law gained its scientific credentials from Greek philosophy and its 
dialectic method. Another Greek import was that of individualism, the foundation 
of law on the ‘basis of freedom and individualism’ (p. 84) (Schulz 1946: 85, 112, 119). 
There is thus much of the same in Roman jurisprudence and British legal scholarship: 
the concentration on practical legal solutions, the abstention from grand theories, and 
the recusal from advocacy. Of course, this was by no means a sign that Schulz had 
conflated the Roman and British jurists. It is perhaps possible that working within the 
British system, he had simply elaborated on the points that appeared relevant for his 
audience there.
The third and final book (Schulz’s main works are books) was Classical Roman 
Law (1951). In it, Schulz continued to deepen the thesis of classicism, humanism and 
liberalism as the great foundations of the Roman legal tradition. In all of the books, the 
great uniting factor is (beyond the continuing belief in interpolationary research) the 
separation between law and politics: of the harmfulness of needless legislative inputs 
and the interference of political power in the law.
Within the praise of the Roman legal achievement, there were still elements that 
may be understood through the background of Nazi racial laws, for example, his 
exaltation of the Roman law of marriage: 
The classical law of marriage is an imposing, perhaps the most imposing, 
achievement of the Roman legal genius. For the first time in the history of 
civilization there appeared a purely humanistic law of marriage, viz. a law founded 
on a purely humanistic idea of marriage as being a free and freely dissoluble union 
of two equal partners for life. (Schulz 1951, 103)
Recent scholars have questioned the accuracy of Schulz’s idealistic interpretation 
(Urbanik 2016: 483). While the Nazi legal machinery regulated marriage with the 
aim of the preservation of racial purity and the continuation of the race through 
procreation, Schulz’s Roman marriage was its complete opposite, a radical alternative 
to not only the Nazi marriage laws that forbade marriage between unsuitable partners 
such as Jews and ‘Aryans’ but also the modern European laws that were founded on the 
legal oppression of women and the obstacles placed on divorce.
Schulz never returned to live in Germany, preferring to stay in Britain. Alongside 
Pringsheim, he had sought and gained British citizenship in 1947. His family had left 
Germany for good, many of his children ending up in the United States, and despite 
the continuing financial hardship the prospect of a permanent return was not enticing. 
He was offered teaching positions, honorary doctorates and other possibilities to come 
back to Germany, but he held on to a fairly tenuous position as a tutor in Oxford. 
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Despite this, Schulz’s influence continues to be significant in German Roman law 
scholarship, mostly due to his single student, Werner Flume.
Like Pringsheim, Schulz was a thoroughly international scholar to begin with, 
and thus the issue of tradition and influence of exile remains elusive. In his Roman 
law scholarship, he remained very much tied to the German style of research, with 
strong links to Italy. However, what the move to Britain meant for him was the 
necessity of applying a more general approach in scholarship and stepping back from 
the interpolationist school that was losing steam at the time. Instead, he would turn 
to the ideas of legal science and the self-referentiality of jurisprudence. One should 
not underestimate his influence in Britain, especially on the ideals of freedom and 
science in law and legal scholarship. The change in Schulz’s scholarship was forced by 
the exile experience, by the forced removal from his zone of comfort both scientifically 
and socially. In the end, Schulz reprocessed the learning he had into a new kind of 
synthesis, one that was again significant when brought back to Germany. (Legal Science 
was translated into German only in 1961.)
David Daube: An outsider who thrived
Our two previous examples, Pringsheim and Schulz, were driven to exile at the height 
of their careers. They were widely known and respected scholars who were settled in 
their ways and universities. In contrast, our third example is that of David Daube, 
a man three decades the junior of Pringsheim and Schulz. For the development of 
Roman law scholarship in Britain, Daube was to be the most consequential. Born in 
1909, Daube was exiled already in 1933 and made his career first in Britain and then in 
the United States, at UC Berkeley. The example of Daube is one of interest since he was 
one of the great success stories of the German diaspora. If one compares him with, say, 
Hans Julius Wolff, the difference is huge. Wolff (born in 1902) would go into exile in 
1935 in Panama and work his way around the United States during the 1940s and early 
1950s, in places such as Tennessee or Oklahoma but without having a great impact. 
Only on his return to Germany would he rise to the professorship and make a splendid 
career. In contrast, Daube would begin a new education in Cambridge and ultimately 
became the Regius professor of civil law at Oxford.15
Though Daube had had his basic training in Germany with some very good people 
such as Otto Lenel, Pringsheim and Wolfgang Kunkel, he did his doctorate at Cambridge 
under Buckland. In his biography, Rodger describes Daube as being the ideal age for 
an emigrant, able to have gained the rigorous training of German academia but young 
enough to be able to learn the English language properly and to adapt to the different style 
of scholarship (Rodger 2004: 234‒5). His introduction had been Otto Lenel, his teacher 
at Freiburg, who had written in July 1933 to Jolowicz in London, while Pringsheim 
had written to Buckland at Cambridge and de Zulueta at Oxford. Ultimately, Daube 
moved to Cambridge in 1933, but continued to visit Germany. In 1938, with the help of 
Cambridge friends, he arranged the flight of his family from Germany to Britain.16
In the case of Daube, the change in scholarship due to the experience in exile is 
thus total – one of immersion and refashioning. Before exile, he had published just 
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a couple of articles, meaning that there was no real comparison of before and after. 
According to Carmichael, Daube would credit his success to the exile experience, that 
the itinerant life from Germany to Britain and the United States was a key reason for 
the extraordinary fecundity of his work (Carmichael 2004: 124).
Apart from age, another great difference between Daube and the two older professors, 
Pringsheim and Schulz, was one of social standing and religion. While Pringsheim and 
Schulz were prosperous and assimilated members of the Bildungsbu﻿̈rgertum and their 
families had converted to Christianity, Daube was an Orthodox Jew from financially 
precarious circumstances.17 Even when he left Germany, Daube was an outsider.
Daube was a scholar of Roman law, but his other main area of interest was religious 
law, both Talmudic and New Testament. It would have naturally been impossible for 
him to continue his career in Germany during the Nazi period, given that while the 
regime had an adverse attitude towards Roman law, it was even less inclined to grant 
additional resources to the study of Jewish law. Beyond the fact that the regime was 
opposed in principle to the subjects that Daube was interested in, his scholarship did 
not have similar traces of content criticism as is detectable in Pringsheim and Schulz. 
What Daube, who was by most accounts an apolitical person uninterested in making a 
political point through scholarship, has are numerous references to the moral choices 
present in the Third Reich and the Second World War.
In his book Appeasement or Resistance (1987), Daube takes up several examples, for 
instance, the ‘Sophie’s choice’ situation of the mayor of Strasbourg during the war. His 
sons had been arrested and due to be executed in retaliation for the actions of resistance 
fighters. The German commander offers him a chance to save one of his sons, but he is 
unable to choose and both are executed. Daube compares this to the games of tyrants in 
classical literature, who made fun out of placing people in impossibly cruel dilemmas. In 
another example, the protagonist is not unknown: Daube’s own teacher Wolfgang Kunkel, 
one of the leading scholars of Roman legal history. Kunkel was a military judge on the 
Eastern Front in 1943, where he was presented with a case of two captains, where one 
had denounced (out of jealousy of the other gaining a promotion) the other for listening 
to Moscow Radio, a capital offence. Rather than sentencing the man to death, Kunkel 
managed to demonstrate via clever legal reasoning that the sentence did not apply (Daube 
1987: 51‒2, 76‒7). Though Kunkel is the hero of this story, he is equally clearly shown 
as a part of the Nazi machinery of terror. These kinds of stories were completely absent 
from the writings of Pringsheim and Schulz, who would refer to the Nazi years only in an 
oblique fashion. This is perhaps due to the general trend of discussion; before the 1960s the 
Nazi years were not discussed so openly and after that only Daube was around to do so.
Daube would hesitate to judge those who had joined the Nazis and instead stressed 
the need to understand the circumstances in which these choices were made.18 
Like many Germans, he was critical of the Nuremberg trials and the conception of 
retroactive justice it embodied. He would make a distinction between those who had 
joined the regime or the party because of anti-Semitic conviction and those who were 
opportunists or just making ends meet. Of course, Carmichael met with Daube only 
when he was in his fifties and time had possibly mellowed his feelings. Nevertheless, 
issues of resistance to and collaboration with tyranny remained a constant theme in his 
writings (Daube 1965; Carmichael 2004: 53, 82‒3).
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Even in Britain, Daube did not feel completely safe. He too was interned on the 
Isle of Man in June 1940, an experience that he later described as horrifying because it 
would have made it possible for a defeated Britain to easily collaborate with the Nazis 
and hand over the Jews collected there. This later recollection shows how deeply the 
existential threat was felt even in Britain. Unlike Pringsheim, Daube was of military 
age, which could explain why he was treated more harshly. He would spend four 
months in the camps and was freed only after petitions from powerful friends.19
Like the older professors Pringsheim and Schulz, Daube was a bridge between 
the Continental and the British traditions of scholarship, but unlike them he would 
become fully acclimatized to the new surroundings. Daube’s links to Germany endured 
during his career, and in his bibliography one sees continuously articles written in 
German for German journals. With his methods and approaches, Daube became 
considerably more Anglo-American, moving freely between law, classics and theology. 
While for the older generation, the events that took place during the Nazi years were 
a clear aberration and signified the destruction of the academic life they had grown 
accustomed to, for Daube, the permanent attachment to a scholarly environment was 
formed only in Britain. Due to his Orthodox background, Daube did not have a similar 
high status in Germany, and due to his younger age the drop in social standing and 
salary was much less than among his older peers.
Making sense of the Nazi years
In the studies of exile scholarship, numerous theories have been presented about the 
way scholars adapt to new circumstances and how they change their approaches and 
form new theories on the basis of their experiences in exile. Some, such as Hannah 
Arendt, dedicated their entire careers to understanding the experience of the Shoah, 
leading to celebrated works like The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), detailing the 
mass movement and its relation to social conditions and ideological elements like anti-
Semitism. Others, for example, Franz Neumann, would tackle the totalitarian state 
in the Behemoth (1944). Beside these celebrated scholars and the very obvious way 
that they were forced to confront the Nazi ideas, the examples dealt with here show a 
similar tendency of engaging the ideological challenge presented by the Nazis.
The challenge of the Nazi order was nothing less than existential for people such as 
Pringsheim, Schulz and Daube. The Nazis not only wanted to exterminate them and 
their families but also disparaged and wanted to abolish their object of study: Roman 
law. The Nazis forced their colleagues to turn on them and stripped them of their 
status, livelihood and occupation. Their relatives were brutally murdered en masse. 
After the war, they were faced with the prospect of reencountering the same people 
that had forced them out of the profession. The fact that they were able to do that is 
nothing short of extraordinary. In the case of most of the exiles who went to the United 
States, for example, Neumann and Arendt, a similar rapprochement never took place.
Both Pringsheim and Schulz would write in defence of what they considered to be 
the true law, the foundation of Western legal culture: Roman law. However, the Roman 
law in their writings becomes enmeshed with virtues and qualities that are more at 
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home with the modern rule of law or the values inherent in liberalism. Humanism, 
individualism, freedom and giving each their due were ideals that they saw to be 
inherent in the works of Roman jurists. Unlike Nazi jurisprudence, which emphasized 
the primacy of the national interest, the political will and racial destiny, their Roman 
law was oriented relentlessly towards justice.
For the exiles, reaching out to the history of law and to Roman law was not simply 
a matter of what they did naturally; the kind of search for meaning that they went 
through was quite out of character. Especially with Schulz, his earlier works had been 
focused on the purely technical analysis of textual transmission that had no greater 
significance, at least openly stated. They operated purely within the tradition. On the 
other hand, during the exile process and in exile, they were to a certain degree outside 
the tradition and the circle of communication that would have understood them. Thus, 
the tradition takes on a different role; it signifies the loss of culture that Germany and 
they personally have gone through. The legal tradition was broken; Nazi totalitarianism 
had not only taken over the law but also subdued the very people who were supposed 
to defend it, the lawyers. By reaching into the past, to the tradition beyond the Nazi 
menace, they were recreating the ideals of law.
In contrast, the work of Daube shows no sign of a similar need to work through 
the issues of law and justice, but distances itself from the whole German experience. 
The way they are presented is largely as examples of totalitarianism and perversions of 
justice, a negation that is in and of itself quite obvious. It is impossible to say whether 
the fear that had gripped Daube, even in Britain, about being turned over to the Nazis 
was something that haunted Pringsheim and Schulz, but it is not possible to say that 
they would have been too idealistic about Britain.
What all of them have in common is praise of the classics of Roman law, the 
uplifting of the Roman legal tradition and its value that was under attack. Much 
of the work they had published, especially some of the minor pieces by Schulz and 
Pringsheim, must have appeared as superficial and bland generalizations to their 
former peers in Germany. In the culture of Roman law scholars in Germany and Italy, 
there existed a widely shared understanding, rarely uttered beyond the festive speeches 
and ponderations of the crisis of Roman law, of the value and meaning of the study 
of Roman law. Within that shared understanding, scholars could concentrate on the 
technical work on the intricacies of legal dogmatics. Since a significant amount of the 
interest was highly technical and based on the relevance provided by the said legal 
rules in the interpretation of the German Civil Code or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
there was equally a tendency towards sterility, the separation of the law from the life. 
What made the writings of someone such as Schulz or Pringsheim so important was 
that they were able to convey not only the technical side but also the meaning of the 
study of Roman law in the big picture, the development of the Western legal tradition. 
Whether they appreciated the style that they had to adopt for writing to a new audience 
unaccustomed to the scholarly style, I would be highly sceptical. Nevertheless, it was 
enough to prompt their students to embark on a novel type of research in Roman law.
The very fact that the exiles would write about the matters of legal heritage that 
reflected their experiences of exile was a rarity. When discussing exile legal scholars, 
one often mentions persons like Bodenheimer or Neumann who would take up the 
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Nazi past and analyse it. In contrast, the vast majority never did openly discuss their 
painful experiences. This may be a similar phenomenon as that of the soldiers who 
never discussed their wartime experiences. A comparison of sorts is the case of the 
Jewish refugees who fled to the United States and were assigned teaching positions in 
historically black colleges in the South. In her remarkable history of these scholars, 
Gabrielle Edgcomb notes that of these dozens of people, none wrote a single line 
of what must have been a surreal experience moving from the persecution of Nazi 
Germany to a different kind of persecution in the Jim Crow South (Edgcomb 1993).
For our scholars, Schulz, Pringsheim and Daube, despite their tribulations, the 
movement to exile was one of privilege. They were at the apex of German academic life 
and would stay there beyond the Nazi period itself. When subjected to a new tradition, 
they did that in the comfort of Oxford, helped by innumerable friends who sought 
to aid them. Their contact with the British tradition was not unproblematic, and it is 
not sure that they really overcame their sense that the legal and academic culture they 
had left was superior to the one they encountered in exile. In a similar manner, the 
experience with liberalism and other ideological traits may have been one of gradual 
influence and where the actual implications became evident only back in Germany. 
However, the great change that took place, that of the transition to a new country, 
to take up a new language and to write for a new audience, was one of great success. 
Whatever traumas they had they kept to themselves, in a manner typical of men of 
their age. 
Conclusion
The issue of observing change in scholarship, the adoption of new ideas and 
perceptions is difficult in and of itself, but these difficulties are compounded by the 
fact that even the persons themselves were not aware of these changes. Many of 
the German scholars who ended up in Britain during the 1930s were people with a 
previous interest in British culture (if there may be said to exist such a thing) and a 
certain admiration towards Britain. Hermann Kantorowicz, one of the most famous of 
the Romanist emigrants, was a long-time anglophile, who admired British humanism 
and individualism (Ibbetson 2004: 276).
It is hard to estimate the impact that Britain, its strange ways and its liberal 
democracy, had on the exiles. It is evident that for them the British scientific world 
was very much lacking compared to the one that they had left behind in Germany. 
However, the same German scientific world had rejected them on grounds that they 
must have considered barbaric (not to mention the deprivations by the Nazis they 
endured). In Britain, they were helped by the peculiar British idealism. The British 
exile was, if nothing else, a mixed bag of traumatic experiences and human kindness.
The relationship with Britain and its influence on scholarship was thus mostly one of 
unintended consequences. Firstly, the need to explain things to a new audience forced 
all of them to open up their writing and to say out loud much that was considered self-
evident in Germany. Secondly, the fact that they were speaking to a new audience meant 
that much had to be presented through a new vocabulary, in a language and terminology 
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that the new audience would understand. Thirdly, within this process of opening up, 
there was perhaps an unintentional way of dealing with the negation of law that Germany 
had turned into. Thus, the classicism and the rather preachy tone of some of the writings, 
the reference to a rule of law and rather anachronistic liberal political references can be 
seen not only as appealing to the audience but also as the working through of the trauma 
at home. This applied almost exclusively to Pringsheim and Schulz, as Daube would 
escape much the trauma of the exiles and the need to work through them.
Notes
1 This research has made been possible by the European Research Council under the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant 
agreement n°313100 (Reinventing the Foundations of European Legal Culture 
1934–1964).
2 Fermi 1968; Ash and Söllner 1996; Rösch 2014. On exiled lawyers, see also Graham 
2002: 777; Lutter, Stiefel and Hoeflich 1993; Breunung and Walther 2012; Breunung 
and Walther, forthcoming.
3 In the case of Schulz, the main work is still Ernst 2004, but future work by Jacob Gil-
taij will shed new light on his career. Pringsheim has been studied by Honoré (2004), 
while Daube is covered by Rodger 2004 and Carmichael 2004. While these studies all 
have their deficiencies, they all discuss at length the exile experience. What they do 
not discuss, however, is the impact of that exile on their scholarship.
4 While there were Jewish legal scholars of German background in the United States, 
they were also greatly affected by the Nazi takeover due to what happened to their 
friends and relatives in Germany.
5 Issues of temperament are notoriously hard to verify; thus we are here reliant on Hon-
oré’s statement. Similar statements do pop up regularly, even late in his stay in Britain. 
Oxford University Press Archives, Oxford, Schulz CP GE 000345, 23, Warden of 
Merton College to Sisam (13.1.1944) about Pringsheim, who has ‘prickly sensitiveness 
about his own resultant position’. He states that ‘I think the College has treated him 
very handsomely, and am surprised that he shouldn’t recognize it’, concluding that he 
is a ‘very difficult case’.
6 Breunung and Walther 2012: 409. There were two articles in the JRS in 1933, one in 
Law Quarterly Review in 1933 and one in Cambridge Law Journal in 1935.
7 Pringsheim’s main works are collected in Gesammelte Abhandlungen, showing his 
combative and assertive style of scholarly debate.
8 Paragraph 19 of the NSDAP party programme from 24 February 1920: ‘We demand 
that Roman Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be replaced by a Ger-
man common law.’ The debate between Pringsheim and Schmitt is now reproduced 
in Pringsheim 1960: 532‒8. On Schmitt’s position, see Mehring 2009; Cumin 2005; 
Balakrishnan 2000; Koenen 1995.
9 This is based on the works in the Gesammelte Werke. On the practical effects of the ban 
on publishing, see the article by Finkenauer and Herrmann 2017 which traces the ref-
erences in the Savigny Zeitschrift and the downturn in the citations of Jewish authors.
10 Pringsheim’s Greek Law of Sale (1950), his main occupation during the war, was ulti-
mately published in East Germany. There is no indication in the archives on why this 
happened, because the book had been prepared for OUP.
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11 Pringsheim 1944: 62: ‘Compared with Roman classical law all other laws were unsci-
entific.’
12 We have one of the letters Pringsheim wrote for Wieacker, dated 12 May 1947, for the 
use of the committees examining former Nazis. On Pringsheim’s travel to Germany 
in the post-war period, see the letters in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Archives of the 
Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, MS. SPSL. 272.1, 233 on his sched-
ule; 190, Pringsheim to Ursell (3 April 1946), on his intent to go to Freiburg and need 
of a certificate of identity from the HO and a return visa; 272.1, 191 Skemp to Under 
Secretary of State (5 April 1946), application for travelling papers for Pringsheim, 
who is willing to assist in the educational reconstruction of Germany, short-term, 
children remain in Great Britain. Letters 192‒206 about the arrangements for travel to 
Germany show how difficult movement was at the time.
13 Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universitätsarchiv zu Berlin, UK Personalia Sch 
303, Personal-Akten des Prof Dr Schulz, Band 2, letters nos. 86, 88–91; The corre-
spondence around Schulz’s move to Britain and his funding are at the SPSL archives 
(Bodleian Library, Oxford, Archives of the Society for the Protection of Science and 
Learning, MS. SPSL. 274.2). The collection consists of 183 pages between 1933 and 
1948 about the conditions of his move, the potential locations and the funding avail-
able. Ernst 2004: 126‒30; Breunung and Walther 2012: 432‒59.
14 The index was the crowning achievement of the interpolationist movement, but its 
origins are in the works of Gradenwitz and Lenel. One of Schulz’s main contribu-
tions was his article ‘Überlieferungsgeschichte der Responsa des Cervidius Scaevola’ 
(Schulz 1931).
15 On Daube’s career, see also Rodger 2001 (his Nachruf in the Savigny Zeitschrift).
16 Carmichael 2004: 55‒6, 69‒71. He reproduces Lenel’s letter from 7 July 1933.
17 The facts of Daube’s early life are from his own recollections collected by Rodger 2004 
and Carmichael 2004: 11‒28, and thus to be taken with a grain of salt.
18 In fact, one of his best friends from high school would join the Nazis. Carmichael 
2004: 22, 63.
19 Carmichael 2004: 63‒5; Rodger 2004: 234 only glosses over this episode.
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